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I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, employees have lost lawsuits or grievances when they have
been terminated as a result of their dishonesty.1 There is something novel,
however, about an employer defending an alleged discrimination suit on the
basis of employee dishonesty that was unknown to the employer at the time
of the discharge. Increasingly, employers are using evidence discovered after
an employee's termination to defend against discrimination suits brought by
2
those employees.
Under the doctrine of after-acquired evidence, an employer may avoid total
liability for its illegal discriminatory conduct if it can establish either that an
employee participated in misconduct before he or she was discharged, or that

Morley Witus, Defense of Wrongful Discharge Suits Based on an Employee's
Misrepresentations,69 MICH. B.J. 50, 50 (1990).
2

Mitchell H. Rubenstein, The Use of PredischargeMisconduct Discovered After an
Employee's Terminationas a Defense in Employment Litigation, 24 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 1, 1

(1990).
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an employee misrepresented information in his or her application for
3
employment.
The first federal case to address the issue of after-acquired evidence and its
application to employment discrimination is the Tenth Circuit's decision,
Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.4 Since Summers,
employers have been armed with a powerful weapon in defending
employment discrimination claims brought in the federal courts.5 The Summers
decision established that if an employee has engaged in some form of
predischarge misconduct, and the employer can demonstrate that it would

have fired the employee had the employer known of such misconduct, then a
6
plaintiff will be barred from recovering for an employer's discrimination.
There are presently varying applications of the Summers rule in the federal
circuits. The Tenth, Sixth and Ninth circuits have followed Summers

wholeheartedly and have completely barred recovery based on after-acquired
evidence. 7 The Seventh Circuit appears to have modified the Summers rule but

it too has completely barred recovery under certain circumstances. 8 The
Eleventh Circuit has criticized the Summers rule and has refused to completely

bar recovery to a claimant based on after-acquired evidence altogether. 9
The circuits that apply after-discovered evidence as a complete defense

subscribe to the principle that an employee is not entitled to complain about
his or her discharge or other adverse employment action if the employee
obtained the job either by lying on his or her application, or by violating the

3
1d. To illustrate, suppose a black female who has an impeccable work record is
terminated from her employment. She files a Title VII action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e against her employer for race and sex discrimination. The evidence
overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the employee was terminated solely
because she was a woman. The employer, however, files a motion for summary
judgment presenting evidence (which was discovered one year after the termination
and which the employerhad no knowledge of at the time of the employee's termination)
that the employee misrepresented her educational background on her employment
application. The employer argues thatbased on the employee's misrepresentations, she
is barred from recovering under Title VII regardless of the employer's illegal motives
to terminate her. Under the after-acquired evidence doctrine, the court would hold that
the employer has asserted a legitimate affirmative defense which completely bars
plaintiff relief under Title VII and would grant summary judgment for the employer.
Due to the employee's misrepresentations, which had nothing to do with the cause of
the employee's termination, the employee is awarded nothing, and the employer has
escaped all liability.

4864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
5

Witus, supra note 1, at 50.

6864 F.2d at 708.
7

See discussion infra part fl.B.c.

8

See discussion infra part ll.B.d.

9
See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d
1489 (1994) (rehearing en banc granted).
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employer's trust by engaging in misconduct during employment. 10 The
general belief in these circuits is that to allow an employee to recover under
such circumstances would reward the employee's deceit or fraudulent
concealment.11 This defense, however, rewards employers 12who may now
avoid total liability for their unlawful employment practices.
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that application of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine as a complete defense is too rigid and that it produces harsh,
inequitable results. At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit has voted to rehear
the case setting forth this view. Until the rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit's
principles are sound. 13 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has criticized Summers
as being antithetical to the principal purposes of Title VII,14 which are to
achieve equality of employment opportunity and make whole, so far as is
possible, the individual or class affected by the discrimination. 15 The Eleventh
Circuit and arbitral forums, such as the National Labor Relations Board
(hereinafter NLRB) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter EEOC), have applied after-acquired evidence as a partial defense
which will bar an employee's reinstatement, but will award limited injunctive
and back pay relief.
Part II of this note will review certain federal decisions adopting or rejecting
the Summers rule to illustrate where claimants stand in different jurisdictions
across the nation. By closely examining the case law addressing after-acquired
evidence, the intent of Part II is to expose how the courts have misinterpreted
mixed-motive principles and how they have erroneously extended these
principles in denying relief to discrimination claimants.
Part III of this note will discuss why application of the after-acquired
evidence doctrine, as a complete defense barring total recovery, frustrates the
principal purpose of Title VII. Part III will also discuss how the EEOC's

1OWitus, supra note 1, at 50. Falsification of employment applications is a serious
problem facing employers today. Rubenstein, supra note 2,at 1 n.1 (citing Dobranski, A
Memo on Falsifications of Employment Applications: An Arbitral Perspective, 59
CHICAGO-KENTL.REV. 997,997 (1983)). One survey indicated that one in ten firms found
applicants lying on resumes. Id. Eighty percent of executives have stated that they would
fire employees for this reason. Id. Only one third of the companies polled, however,
always verify resume information. Id. The most common form of employment
application falsification, at least in the arbitral forum involves criminal records and
medical histories. Id. (citing J. REDEKER, EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE POLICIES AND PRACTICES

219 (1989)).
11Kristufek v. Hussmann Food Services, No. 87 C 5621,1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14287,
at *5 (7th Cir. Oct. 3, 1991).
12 Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 5.
13 See discussion infra part lI.B.d.
1442 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (hereinafter Title VII).
15

Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d
1489 (1994) (rehearing en banc also granted).
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approach, a more fair and equitable approach, balances the respective rights of
both the employer and employee under Title VII.
APPLICATION AMONG THE FEDERAL
II. THE SUMMERS DECISION AND ITm
CIRCUITS
The roots of the after-acquired evidence defense are deeply seeded in
common law principles of fraud 16 and the equitable "clean hands" doctrine.
"Equity will not grant relief to a party who as actor, seeks to set judicial
machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, if such party, in prior conduct,
has violated conscience or good faith .. "17 Similarly, the law with respect to
master and servant has long recognized that, "in order for an employer to justify
a dismissal, it is not necessary for the employer to show that in dismissing [an]
employee, [the employer] in fact acted upon some proper ground of
dismissal." 18 According to these traditional views, "it is not material whether
the employer knew of the grounds which in fact existed at the time of discharge;
notwithstanding his ignorance, he may avail himself thereof .. "19
One of the central issues surrounding the after-acquired evidence doctrine
is whether these common law principles should be extended to rights which
are statutorily mandated. Title VII was enacted to prohibit an employer from
unlawfully discharging, or otherwise discriminating against, any individual
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.20 Yet,
in most cases where the after-acquired evidence defense is raised, courts have
granted summary judgment without examining the motive of the employer's
actions. 21 Such rulings are contrary to the intent of Title VII and the rights
16

Witus, supra note 1, at 1; see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 409(1)
cmt. e (1958)(if a principal has cause for the discharge of an agent and discharges him,
the fact that the principal is not at the time aware that he has cause for discharge is
immaterial).
17
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 250 (6th ed. 1990). But see Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co.,
968 F.2d 1174,1181, n.10 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
the argument that the doctrine of clean hands bars relief under Title VII, the court
concluded that even if the doctrine were applicable to after-acquired evidence cases, the
doctrine would be limited by the remedial goals of Title VII).
18
See generally 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 46 (1987).
19Id.
2042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
21

Rubenstein, supra, note 2, at 4. Once an employer has asserted the after-the-fact
defense, summary judgment will be hard to oppose for the employee. The majority of
cases have resulted in summary judgment being granted for the employer. See e.g.,
George v. Meyers, No. 91-2308-0,1992 WL 97777, at *11, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6419, at
*2-*3 (D. Kan. April 24,1992)(granting summary judgment for the employer); O'Day v.
McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D.Ariz. 1992)(granting summary
judgment under a "would have fired" standard). An employee is usually hard pressed
to present evidence that will refute the employer's assertion that it would have either
not hired the employee had it known of his or her misrepresentations or would have
fired the employee immediately upon discovery of the employee's misrepresentations
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/12
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afforded therein. The focus of this section is to explain how the federal courts
have rationalized the denial of relief on the basis of after-acquired evidence.
A. The Summers Decision
Plaintiff, V. Ray Summers, was a field claims representative for State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for nineteen years before he was fired
from the company on May 19, 1982.22 For seventeen of those years, Summers
had a satisfactory employment record with State Farm.2 3 In July 1980, however,
State Farm discovered that Summers had falsified a document.24 Summers did
not deny his falsification of the document and he was warned that the
recurrence of such conduct could result in his discharge. 25 In September 1981,
State Farm discovered that Summers had falsified other documents dating back
to 1977.26 Summers was again warned about the ramifications of any future
falsifications. 2 7
As a result of discovering this second batch of falsified documents, State
Farm randomly selected and then audited 90 files which contained claims
handled by Summers. 28 State Farm decided that seven or eight of these records
seemed "suspicious."29 Summers was again confronted with the
latest-discovered falsifications and again instructed not to falsify company
records. 30 Instead of terminating Summers's employment, State Farm placed
or misconduct. An employer can usually satisfy its burden of proof by way of affidavit.
Plaintiffs have tried to argue that such affidavits are "self serving" and should not be
accepted as conclusive by the court. See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp 656 (D.
Utah 1990), affd, 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994). The courts, however, have rejected this
argument when a plaintiff cannot sufficiently rebut the sworn testimony of a company
officer contained in an affidavit. See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, Ill.,
969 F.2d 250
(7th Cir. 1992)(fact that employer only suspended a female officer who was involved in
a hit and run and arrested for DUI, not sufficient evidence to refute the employer's
assertion that it would have fired the plaintiff upon learning of his prior convictions).
But see DeVoe v. Medi-Dyn, 782 F. Supp. 546 (D. Kan. 1992)(denying summary judgment
based on a "would not have hired" standard, noting that defendant actually knew of the
alleged concealment on employment application at the time of firing and did not rely
upon it); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo.1991)(denying
summary judgment based on a "would not have hired" standard).
22

Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 701 (10th Cir. 1988).

23

1d. at 702.

24

1d. Summers forged the signature of a company representative to a "loss-of-wages"
claim made by one of the company employees.
2 5Id.
26

1d. Summers falsified various medical and pharmacy bills for medical services.

27

Summers, 864 F.2d at 702.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.
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Summers on probationary status for two weeks without pay.31 Summers's
employment continued until May 19, 1982, when he was discharged not due
to his falsification of company records, but instead, based on Summers's poor
attitude and failure to get along with customers and co-employees. 32 Summers
brought suit against State Farm alleging age and religious discrimination. 33
Summers was a 56 year old member of the Mormon Church at the time of his
34
discharge.
In State Farm's preparation for trial in 1986, the company uncovered more
than 150 falsifications after thoroughly examining all records prepared by
Summers.3 5 Eighteen of the falsifications were made subsequent to Summers'
return to work from probation.36 Summers did not deny making the
falsifications when he was deposed for trial. 37 Subsequently, Summers sought
to bar State Farm from introducing evidence of the newly-discovered
falsifications by filing a motion in limine.38 Summers contended that these
falsifications were irrelevant and inadmissible because they were not
discovered until 1986, four years after he had been discharged. He further
contended that State Farm should only be allowed to present evidence relating
to the reasons it had given for Summers's termination back in 1982.39
State Farm opposed Summers' motion and filed a motion for summary
judgment based upon the 150 newly discovered falsifications. 40 State Farm
conceded that the additional falsifications discovered in 1986 could not have
been a cause or reason for Summers' termination in 1982, as they were
unknown to State Farm at the time.4 1 Nevertheless, State Farm argued that the
additional falsifications should be considered in determining what relief or
remedy was available to Summers and that under the circumstances, no relief
should be granted.42 Before the district court could rule on Summers' motio n

31

id.

32

Summers, 864 F.2d at 702-703.

33

1d. Summers brought his age discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination
inEmploymentActof 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (as amended), and his religious
discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2(a), 3(a) (as amended).
34

Summers, 864 F.2d at 702.

35

1d. at 703.

36[d.
37

1d.
1d.

38
39

Summers, 864 F.2d at 704.

40

1d.

4

1Id.

42

1d.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/12
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in limine, it granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment finding
Summers was entitled to no relief due to his misconduct.43 Summers appealed.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court that, although later
evidence of Summers' misconduct was not the "cause" of his termination, it
was relevant to Summers' claim of "injury," and did itself preclude the grant of
any present relief or remedy to Summers. 44 In reaching its decision, the Tenth
Circuit relied on the mixed-motive principles first established in Mt. Healthy
City School DistrictBoard of Educationv. Doyle.4 5
Mt. Healthy involved a Title VII action for discrimination where a teacher
was fired for criticizing a possible dress code for teachers to a local disc jockey
(which was thereafter announced on the air), and for making obscene gestures
toward two students who failed to obey his commands in his capacity as
cafeteria supervisor.4 6 In finding for the teacher, the lower courts determined
that the call to the radio station was protected by the First Amendment and
ordered reinstatement and back pay, despite the obscene gesture incident.47 On
grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
fact that protected First Amendment conduct played a substantial part in the
school district's decision not to rehire the teacher did not mean that the teacher
was entitled to remedial action.4 8 The Supreme Court held that if the school
district could have dismissed the teacher for the obscene gesture, and in fact
would have done so even if the radio incident had never come to its attention,
it did not matter that protected First Amendment conduct played a substantial
part in the school district's decision. 49 The Court in Mt. Healthy established that
an employer will not be liable under Title VII if it can prove that it would have
made the same employment decision absent an impermissible motive. 50

43

1d. at 703.

44

Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.

45429 U.S. 274 (1977). The Tenth Circuit also found persuasive the decision in
Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), which was cited by State
Farm in support of its motion for summary judgment. In Smallwood, the plaintiff sued
United under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634,
for United's refusal to process his application because he was 48 years of age. 728 F.2d
at 615. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the Court of Appeals accepted United's
argument that it should not be liable for its discrimination of Smallwood because they
would not have hired Smallwood, regardless of his age, due to his prior discharge by
another airline. (United was not aware of this discharge at the time it refused to process
Smallwood's application with United.) Id. at 627; see also, Murnane v. American
Airlines, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1979), affd, 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
46

Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 281.

47

1d. at 283.

48

1d. at 285.

49

d.

50See generally, Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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The Tenth Circuit adopted and applied this same reasoning to Summers. The
court opined that even assuming State Farm was motivated, at least in part, if
not substantially, because of Summers' age and religion, the falsifications
discovered after his termination "established serious and pervasive
misconduct", which if known by State Farm at the time of Summers' discharge,
would have justified his termination. 51 Because State Farm established in its
motion for summary judgment that it would have indeed discharged Summers
had it known of the additional falsified documents, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment. To explain its holding,
the court likened the Summers situation to a "hypothetical wherein a company
doctor is fired because of his age, race, religion, and sex and the company, in
defending a civil rights action, thereafter discovers that the discharged
employee was not a doctor."5 2 The court stated that, "[i]n our view the
masquerading doctor would be entitled to no relief, and Summers is in no
better position.' 53
B. Application of the Summers Rule by the Circuits
Although the federal courts have almost unanimously adopted the Summers
rule, they have been neither uniform nor clear in their application of its
principles. 54 Frequently, courts have failed to distinguish between
fraud-in-application cases and on-the-job misconduct cases 55 and have applied
the Summers rule equally to both situations. At times the grounds for decisions
are no more than conclusory statements that a plaintiff is not entitled to relief
or has not been injured.5 6
The extension of the Summers rule to fraud-in-application cases has led to
disagreement among the circuits as to the correct application of the Summers
rule in after-acquired evidence cases. In reviewing federal case law, however,
one fact is apparent: a majority of the federal circuits are committed to barring
recovery to a plaintiff who is not wholly innocent.

5 1Summers v.
52

Id.

53

Id.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700,708 (10th Cir. 1988).

54See, e.g., Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1188 (11th Cir. 1992)
(Godbold, J., dissenting), vacated,32 F.3d 1489 (1994) (rehearing en banc granted). As a
case in point, a majority of the judges of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have
recently voted to hold a rehearing of the case en banc. See discussion infra, part ll.B.d.
55Id. The term "fraud-in-application" has been used by the courts when referring to
after-acquired evidence cases which involve a plaintiff that has misrepresented
information either on his or her resume or application for employment, or has made
misrepresentations to the prospective employer during the interview process.
"On-the-job" misconduct cases involve an employee who has, during the course of his
employment, committed some fraudulent or illegal action against the company while
in the employ of the company.
56 Id.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/12
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a. Tenth Circuit
The first Tenth Circuit case to apply the Summers defense to a
fraud-in-application case was Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co. 57 Despite
the fact that Summers did not address the issue of application fraud, the district
court nonetheless held that the Mathis case fell "squarely within the [Summers]
58
holding."
In Mathis, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas granted
summary judgment for the employer in a race and sex discrimination suit
brought under Title VI.59 The plaintiff, Mathis, alleged race discrimination
based on remarks made by her co-workers and supervisors regarding her race
claiming she was denied overtime pay based on her race. 60 She further alleged
that her employer's failure to consider reasonable alternatives to placing her
on involuntary maternity leave constituted sex discrimination. 61 A year after
her termination, Boeing discovered that Mathis had omitted certain
employment history and a prior felony conviction on her resume. 62 In its
motion for summary judgment, the employer denied the existence of any racial
or sexual discrimination and argued that even if Mathis was discriminated
against summary judgment would be proper in light of the Tenth Circuit's
recent holding in Summers.63
Relying on Summers, Boeing argued that if Mathis had truthfully disclosed
the complete information regarding both her employment history and felony
conviction she would not have been hired. 64 Boeing further argued that
employees had been discharged on a consistent basis for such falsifications and
if Boeing had known of Mathis's misrepresentations then Mathis would have
been terminated immediately.65
Mathis argued that in her case, the application falsifications did not rise to
the level of wrongdoing present in Summers, and, therefore, Summers should
not apply. She further attempted to persuade the court that a rigid application
of the Summers rule would lead to "extreme results."6 6 The district court
concluded that the difference in the number of falsifications between the two
cases had little impact on the court's decision and that it lacked the authority

57719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989).
58 d. at 995.
591d.

at 994.
993.
d. at 994.

60 Id.at
61

62Mathis, 719 F. Supp.

at 993 n.2.

631d. at 994.
64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
65
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to modify or limit the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Summers.67 The court held that
because the omissions made by Mathis on her employment application were
material to her employment, as were the plaintiff's falsifications in Summers,
Mathis's fraudulent actions precluded relief under Title VII. 68
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Utah also granted
summary judgment for an employer in a fraud-in-application case. The Utah
court in reaching its decision, however, followed the Summers holding more
closely than the district court of Kansas.
In O'Driscoll v. Hercules,69 plaintiff was employed at Hercules' Bacchus
Works in Magna, Utah, from January 1980 to April 1986. O'Driscoll filed an
action in the district court alleging that her termination violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.70 When preparing for trial, defendant Hercules learned that O'Driscoll had
misrepresented her age and other items on three separate forms: a
pre-employment examination, an employment application, and an U.S.
Government "Application and Authorization for Access to Confidential
Information."71 O'Driscoll admitted to falsifying these documents.72 Hercules
also alleged that it had discovered many other misrepresentations made by
O'Driscoll during her employment. 73 Again, O'Driscoll did not deny these
misrepresentations. 74
Based on Summers, Hercules argued that even if the plaintiff could
demonstrate that the company discriminated against her, O'Driscoll was still
entitled to no relief because it had a legitimate independent basis for her
termination. 7 5 Hercules asserted that had it known the extent and nature of
O'Driscoll's misrepresentations, she would have been terminated. 76
As did the plaintiff in Maths, O'Driscoll tried to counter this attack by
arguing that the Summers rationale was inapplicable because O'Driscoll's
misconduct was not as "serious and pervasive" as the conduct in Summers.77
67

Mathis, 719 F. Supp. at 995.

68

Id.

69745 F. Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1990), afd, 12 F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994).
7O1d.at 657. O'Driscoll also alleged her discharge violated Utah's Antidiscrimination
Act and filed several violations of state law, including breach of employment contract

and wrongful discharge.
71

1d.

72

Id.at 657.

73

1d.

74

0'Driscoll, 745 F. Supp. at 657.

75

Id.at 658.
76Id.
77
Id.
at 658. O'Driscoll asserted many of the misrepresentations alleged by Hercules
were mere "misunderstandings" on her part. Id. at 657.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/12
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The district court rejected this argument and held that, while O'Driscoll's
threshold argument was not totally excluded from the Summers analysis, the
focus should not be on determining whether certain conduct is "severe and
pervasive." The true focus, according to the Utah court, should be on whether
the employee would have been terminated had the employer known of the
misconduct in question at the time of the discharge. 78 Finding that Hercules
would have indeed fired O'Driscoll had it known of her misrepresentations,
the district court granted summary judgment in Hercules favor.79
The glaring problem evident in decisions such as Mathis and O'Driscoll is
that the employer is able to shift the focus in a discrimination suit from the
alleged wrongdoing of the employer to the wrongdoing of the
employee/plaintiff. What was once a complaint to examine the motives of an
employer's actions instead becomes an inquisition into an employee's past
misconduct--misconduct which admittedly had nothing to do with the
employee's termination. Although the truthfulness of the employee may be
relevant in determining what relief should be awarded to a complaining
plaintiff, the courts, by application of the Summers rule, are totally eliminating
theneed to investigate the employer's true motivations. Instead of determining
whether the employer has violated a federal statute, a plaintiff is forced to
defend some previously unrelated misconduct; misconduct which admittedly,
had nothing to do with the termination of the employee. Under Summers, an
employer can freely discriminate against an individual and never have his
motives examined provided that he can find some misconduct in the
employee's past. Surely, the legislature never intended Title VII and/or other
federal statutes to be circumvented in such a way. Nor does such a rule of law
comport with general principles of equity.
b. Sixth Circuit
By relying primarily on the Tenth Circuit cases which have been decided
since Summers, the Sixth Circuit also has denied relief in fraud-in-application
cases. In Johnson v. Honeywell,80 the Sixth Circuit joined the other circuits
committed to upholding the Summers rule when it denied relief to a plaintiff
who had misrepresented her educational background on her employment
application.

78

1d. at 659.

79 0'Driscoll, 745

F. Supp. at 660. The Court also applied the Summers rule to

O'Driscoll's claims underUtah's Antidiscrimination Actand her common law wrongful

discharge claim. Id. Findingno indication in Utah's state law that the Utah StateSupreme
Court would either adopt or reject the principles set out in Summers, the federal court
opined that the Utah Supreme Court "would apply Summers because of the soundness

of its approach." Id.; see also Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir.
1992) (federal court applied Summers rule to Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act,

MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 37.2101-37.3804 (1977)).
80955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
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The plaintiff in Johnson filed an action against her employer alleging
wrongful discharge and retaliatory discharge in violation of Michigan's
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act.8 1 Honeywell employed Johnson as a field
relations manager. Between November 1976 and November 1984, Johnson was
responsible for various employment matters, including providing assistance
to branch managers in creating affirmative action programs, responding to
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charges and hiring.82 Johnson
claimed the motivating factor in Honeywell's decision to fire her was not poor
job performance, as asserted by the company, but was due to her conflicts with
certain branch managers regarding establishing affirmative action goals and
their resistance to her efforts to meet those goals.8 3
During the course of discovery, Honeywell learned that Johnson had
misrepresented certain aspects of her educational qualifications on her
employment application. 84 Honeywell moved for summary judgment on the
breach of contract claim and retaliatory claim under Elliott-Larsen arguing that
the misrepresentations in Johnson's employment application provided a
complete defense to liability, even though Honeywell was totally unaware of
such misrepresentations at the time of Johnson's discharge. 8 5 In addressing
whether evidence of employee misconduct unknown to an employer at the
time of discharge should be admissible as substantive evidence, the Court of
Appeals not only considered if Honeywell would have fired Johnson had it
known of her misrepresentations, but also focused on whether Honeywell
would not have hired Johnson in the first place, had it been aware of her true
86
educational background.
With respect to the retaliatory discharge claim under Michigan's
Elliott-Larsen statute, the court held that Johnson's misrepresentations as to
her educational background barred her recovery.87 The Court stated, "we agree
with the reasoning of the court in Summers, and hold that on these facts,
even if we assume that Honeywell discharged Johnson in retaliation for her

81

d. at 411. Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.270(a) (West 1992), forbids retaliation or discrimination against a person "because the

person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge,
filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this act." [citation omitted] The act is intended to provide similar
protections as Title VII and Michigan courts look to Title VII in order to resolve questions
under the Act. Johnson, 955 F.2d at 415 n.1.
82
83

Johnson, 955 F.2d at 415.
d. at 411.

84Id. Johnson claimed to have earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University
of Detroit when in fact she had only completed four courses.
85
U. at 412.
86

1. at 413.

87

Johnson, 955 F.2d at 413.
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opposition to violations of the Act, she is not entitled to relief.' 88 The Court
concluded that Johnson was barred from relief even if she could prove a
violation of Elliott-Larsen since Honeywell had shown that had it known about
Johnson's resume fraud it would not have hired her and it would have fired
her if it learned of the fraud during her employment. 89
Therefore, as a general rule, summary judgment will be appropriate in
resume-fraud decisions in the Tenth and Sixth Circuits, where: (1) the
misrepresentation or omission was material, (2) the misrepresentation was
directly related to ascertaining a potential candidate's qualifications for
employment, and (3) it was relied upon by the employer in rendering the hiring
decision. 90

c. Seventh Circuit
Although the Seventh Circuit claims not to have "squarely adopted the
Summers rule,"9 1 a review of its case law proves otherwise. Generally, the
Seventh Circuit will deny a plaintiff relief in after-acquired evidence cases. The
Seventh Circuit has, however, deviated from other circuits in that it refuses to
apply the "would not have hired" standard to fraud-in-application cases.
Instead, according to the Seventh Circuit, the correct focus is on whether the
employer would have fired the employee had it known of the application fraud
or other misconduct. 92 The Seventh Circuit has relied predominantly on the
mixed-motive principles first iterated in Mt. Healthy, and later clarified in Price
Waterhousev. Hopkins,93 to guide its decisions. A review of Mt. Healthyand Price

88Id.
89

1d. at 414.

90

Id. Other Sixth Circuit cases following Johnson include Milligen-Jensenv. Michigan
Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992). The plaintiff in Milligen-Jensen filed a sex
discrimination and retaliation complaint against Michigan Tech. Jensen omitted from
her employment application a DUI conviction. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's "Solomon-like" approach which did not totally bar plaintiff relief, but
reduced the amount of her recovery by 50%. Id. at 304. Relying on Honeywell, the Court
of Appeals held that because Jensen would not have been hired, or would have been
fired if Michigan Tech. had known of her falsifications, Jensen had suffered no legal
damage by being fired. Id. According to the court, Jensen's claim of discrimination was
thereafter irrelevant. Id.
91Washington v. Lake County, Ill.,
969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992).
921d.
93490 U.S. 228 (1989). Price Waterhouse clarified the role of Mt. Healthy and
mixed-motive principles in the context of Title VII. The Court essentially confirmed the
Mt. Healthy analysis applied to Title VII and held that in a mixed-motive case, if the
plaintiff bears her burden of proving that an impermissible criterion was a "substantial
factor" in the adverse employment decision, then the burden of persuasion shifts to the
employer to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would
actually have been made absent an unlawful motive. 968 F.2d at 1180 (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). Price Waterhouse has subsequently been
overturned by the enactment of Section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; however,
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Waterhouse, however, leads to the conclusion that the Seventh Circuit has
misconstrued mixed-motive principles and that the holding of Price Waterhouse
has no application to after-acquired evidence.
In Washington v. Lake County,Illinois94 the plaintiff was an African-American
who was fired from his position as a jailer at the Lake County Sheriff's
Department, allegedly in violation of TItle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as well as 42 U.S.C Sections 1981 and 1983.95 The district court granted Lake
County's motion for summary judgment holding that, even if Washington was
fired on account of his race, he was entitled to no relief because he lied on his
96
employment application when he indicated he had no criminal convictions.
On appeal, Washington argued that the district court erred in granting Lake
County's motion for summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Sheriff's department would not have hired him
had it known of his prior convictions, or would have fired him had Lake
County discovered them.97 The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court
decision holding that, even assuming Lake County had discriminated against
Washington because of his race, a finding of discrimination would not matter
because Lake County established that it would have fired Washington when it
discovered his lie about not having any prior convictions. 98
In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that it was improper to focus on whether Lake County would not have hired
Washington had it known of his criminal convictions. 99 In determining that the
"would have fired" standard is most appropriately applied to cases like
Washington, the court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Price Water-

this section has no bearing on the law applicable to after-acquired evidence. For a full
explanation, see infra note 117.

94969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
95Washington, 969 F.2d at 251.
96
1d. Washington had in fact pled guilty to criminal trespassand was convicted of
third degree assault, although he spent no time in jail for these crimes. Id.
97
98

1d.
d. at 255.

99

d. at 256. Although the Court recognized that an employer will very likely decide
not to hire somebody who misrepresents himself on an application, (especially if the
misrepresentation concerns a material requirement for the position sought), the court
also noted that an employer might be less willing to fire an employee if the
misrepresentation is discovered after the employer has started the job and has proven
himself to be capable. Id. at 254 (citing Bonger v. American Water Works, 789 F. Supp.
1102,1106 (D. Colo. 1992)). The court determined that focusing on whether an applicant
would not have been hired is an unjustified importation of property right concepts into
employment discrimination law. 969 F.2d at 256. The court concluded that such a focus
was improper because a property right in one's job is not a requirement for showing
injury in a federal discrimination claim. Id.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol42/iss3/12
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house100 in reaching this conclusion. A review of Price Waterhouse, however,
shows that reliance on mixed-motive principles is entirely misguided and has
no place in after-acquired evidence cases.
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that an employment decision
motivated in part by discrimination does not violate Title VII if the employer
can prove that the same employment decision would have been made without
the discriminatory motive. 101 The theory behind this holding is that an
employee who would have been fired anyway, regardless of a discriminatory
motive, cannot claim that he was actually injured by the discriminatory
conduct. 102

The respondent in Price Waterhouse was a female senior manager employed
by a nationwide professional accounting firm. 103 She was proposed for
partnership in 1982.104 She was neither denied nor offered the partnership, but
instead her candidacy was held for reconsideration the following year. 0 5
When the partners later refused to repropose her for partnership, the
respondent resigned and brought a Title VII action against the firm alleging sex
discrimination. 106 The district court held the firm liable finding it had
unlawfully discriminated against the respondent by encouraging sexism and
sexual stereotyping.107 In finding the firm liable, the district court also
concluded that the firm could avoid paying equitable relief, such as back pay,
by proving that it would have placed the respondent's candidacy on hold even
100490 U.S. 228 (1989). The Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit reasoned "that, as in a
resume fraud case, the issue in a mixed-motive case is whether the plaintiff has actually
been injured, and the court is required to undergo a hypothetical inquiry as to what the
company would have done under different circumstances." 969 F.2d at 255.
101490 U.S. at 242.
102
The courts are in agreement that a claimant for back pay under Title VII must
establish that he has suffered actual financial loss as a result of the discriminatory
employment practice in question. See generally, Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation,
Award of Back Pay in Suit Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended by Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (42 USCS §§ 2000e et seq.), For Discriminatory
Employment Practices,21 A.L.R. FED. 472, 534 (1974).
103
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231.

104

Id.
105Id.
106Id.
107
1d. 237. In the initial proposal process, the firm solicited evaluations from all of its
partners, nearly all of whom were men, in order to evaluate the respondent as a
candidate. The evaluations split sharply on the question whether she should be granted
or denied partnership. Her supporters strongly praised her abilities and record of
securing major contracts for the firm, but a number of evaluations sharply criticized her
inter-personal skills and accused her of being abrasive. Several of the evaluations on
both sides made comments implying that the respondent was or had been acting
masculine, and one partner stated she could improve her chances for partnership by
walking, talking and dressing more femininely. 490 U.S. at 234-37.
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absent the discriminatory motive. 108 The court of appeals affirmed the lower
court but held that the employer could avoid liability although, not merely
equitable relief, by proving that the same employment decision would have
been made had discrimination not played a role.1 09
The issue on appeal to the United States Supreme Court was to determine
the respective burdens of proof under Title VII when it has been shown that an
employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate
motives. 110 The Supreme Court held that "once a plaintiff in a Title VII case
shows that [discrimination] played a motivating part in an employment
decision, the defendant may avoid liability only by proving it would have
made the same decision even if it had not allowed [discrimination] to play such
a role." 111
In applying this reasoning to Washington, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the "would have fired standard" should apply to all cases involving
after-acquired evidence, e.g., fraud-in-application and predischarge
misconduct. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that because the
temporal focus in a mixed-motive case is on the time of the adverse
employment decision, a "would not have hired" approach is ultimately
misguided. 112 According to the court, such a standard hypothetically asks the
employer what it would have done at the hiring level, which is totally irrelevant
to a discrimination claim regarding a discriminatory discharge under Title VII.
Rather, the court of appeals stated, "the inquiry in a discrimination case is
whether the plaintiff has been treated differently than similarly situated
employees because of forbidden grounds."'113 To summarize, the court stated,
the appropriate issue in an employment discrimination case where the
plaintiff lied on his application and was later fired for an unrelated
reason is whether the employer, acting in a ... neutral fashion, would
have fired the employee upon discovery of the misrepresentation, not
employer would have hired the employee had it known
whether the
114
truth.
the
Under this rationale, which essentially mirrors the holding in Summers, an
employer may avoid liability in an after-acquired evidence case if the employer
can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that, if acting in a neutral

10 8Price Waterhouse, 490

U.S. at 237.

109Id.
110d at 244.

lld.
112Washington v. Lake County, IlM., 969 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1992).
1 13

1d.

114id.
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manner, it would have made the same employment decision had it known of
the later discovered evidence.115
By extending the same evidentiary framework in Price Waterhouse to cases
involving after-acquired evidence such as Washington, one obvious factual
distinction has been ignored. In Price Waterhouse, the employer was able to
assert a legitimate ulterior motive for discharging the employee that was
present at the time of termination. The very premise of a mixed-motives case
is that an employer may avoid liability if a legitimate reason was present at the
time of the adverseemployment decision.116 Although in an after-acquired evidence
situation a legitimate reason for termination is "theoretically" present, because
it is not discovered until sometime after the termination, it cannot be said to be
"actually" or "practically" present. In other words, in an after-acquired evidence
case, an employer cannot claim that his actions were realistically motivated by
a reason which was not known to him at the time. In the words of the Supreme
Court, "an employer may not.., prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a
legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision ifthat reason did not motivate it
at the time of the decision."11 7 The Supreme Court explained in Price Waterhouse
that when saying a "factor" motivated an employment decision, "wemean that,
if we asked the employer at the moment of the [employment] decision what its
reasons were [for taking such an action,] and if we received a truthful response,
one of those reasons would be that... [factor]." 118 Therefore, the critical inquiry
in determining whether an employer can avoid liability under Title VII,
according to the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, is whether a legitimate
reason was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was made.119

115d.
116
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).
117

d. (emphasis added).

118

1d. at 250.

119

d. at 241 (emphasis added). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned the Supreme
Court's holding in Price Waterhouse to the extent that an employment action violates
Title VII if discrimination was a motivating factor in that decision, regardless of whether
lawful motives were also factored into the decision. Thomas J. Piskorski & Michael A.
Warner, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Overview and Analysis, 8 LAB. LAw. 9 (1992). Title 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. W 1992), provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." This language, however, does not help to clarify the issue of what effect
after-acquired evidence should have on the award of back pay, because under the new
Act, the issue of whetheran employer would have made the same decision in the absence
of any discriminatory motive is still relevant to the remedial phase of the litigation. If
the employer can demonstrate that it would have taken the same action even in the
absence of the impermissible motivation, then the plaintiff is not entitled to damages or
to be reinstated or hired. Id. If courts continue to ignore the time lapse in after-acquired
evidence cases and hold that a plaintiff should not be awarded any remedy under Title
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Although the Seventh Circuit may have believed it was clarifying the law
with respect to after-acquired evidence, in actuality, it merely joined the other
circuits that have erroneously applied mixed-motive principles and have
misconstrued the holdings of Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse. The above
discussion of Price Waterhouse convincingly proves that mixed-motive
principles should not be extended to situations where a legitimate reason for
termination was neither present nor known at the time of the employment
decision.12 0 Therefore, courts should not distort the holding of Price Waterhouse
by ignoring the temporal lapse between the unlawful act and the discovery of
evidence clearly
a legitimate motive.121 The law with respect to after-acquired
122
should not replicate the law applicable to mixed-motives.
d. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit is one to have recognized that the Summers rule
constitutes an unwarranted extension of mixed-motive principles. 123 On
September 6, 1994, however, this decision was vacated and the case is
scheduled to be reheard en banc. 124 Despite this rehearing, the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis in the originally-reported decision provides a viable
alternative approach to the issue of after-acquired evidence.
In Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to adopt the Summers rule finding instead that Mt. Healthy, Price
Waterhouse and their related principles actually subvert, rather than support,
the Summers decision. 125 The court of appeals stated,
Whereas the Mt. Healthyrule excuses all liability based on what actually
would have happened absent the unlawful motive, the Summers rule
goes one step further: it excuses all liability based on what
hypothetically would have occurred absent the alleged discriminatory
motive assuming the employer had knowledge that it would not acquireuntil
sometime during the litigationarisingfrom the discharge.- 6
The court of appeals further found that such a proposition clashed with the
Mt. Healthy principle that a plaintiff should be left in no worse a position than

VII due to his misconduct, the new Civil Rights Act has no bearing on a plaintiff's ability
to successfully obtain relief.
120Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 32 F.3d
1489 (11th Cir. 1994) (rehearing en banc granted).
121

Id.

122

1d.

123

1d. at 1180.

124Wallace, 32 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1994).
125Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1179.
126

1d. at 1179 (emphasis original).
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if he or she had not been a member of a protected class or engaged in protected
opposition to an unlawful employment practice. 12 7 The court concluded that
in Summers, the Tenth Circuit clearly placed the plaintiff in a worse position
than if he had not been a member of a protected class, for absent his age and
his religion, Summers would have remained employed for at least some period
the Tenth Circuit
of time after he was actually discharged. 128 Nevertheless,
12 9
denied him any relief for that lost period of employment.
The Eleventh Circuit further refused to follow the Summers rule because it
considered the Summers approach antithetical to Title VII.130 A plaintiff is not
compensated for his or her lost wages due to an employer's illegal conduct,
and the employer is not discouraged from committing illegal employment
activities in the future. Rather, "it invites employers to establish ludicrously low
thresholds for 'legitimate' termination and to devote fewer resources to
preventing discrimination." 131 The Eleventh Circuit also recognized the
potential in Summers-type cases for an employer to escape all liability by
rummaging through an unlawfully-discharged employee's background for
flaws and then manufacturing a "legitimate" reason for the discharge that fits
the flaws in the employee's background. 132 In Wallace, the Eleventh Circuit
defined an alternative approach to dealing with after-acquired evidence and
concluded that such evidence is relevant only with respect to the amount of
damages and type of relief that should be awarded to the claimant.
The plaintiff in Wallace filed a claim for retaliatory discharge under Title VII
alleging that her numerous objections to sexual harassment caused her
termination. 133 During the plaintiff's deposition, the employer learned that she
had pled guilty to possession of cocaine and marijuana prior to filing her
employment application.134 On her application, the plaintiff had checked "no"
to the question, "Have you ever been convicted of a crime?" 135 After
discovering this information, the employer moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the after-acquired evidence of plaintiff's narcotics convictions
and application fraud served as a legitimate cause for terminating her employ-

12 7
128

,. at 1180.

Id.

129/d.

130Wallace,968 F.2d at 1180.
13 1

1d.
132/d.
133
13 4

135

1d. at 1176.
,d.

Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1177 n.2.
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ment irrespective of any alleged unlawful motives. 136 The district court rejected
137
this theory as a matter of law.
On appeal, although the court of appeals did not totally bar the plaintiff
recovery, it did agree with the abstract proposition espoused in Summers that
after-acquired evidence is relevant to the relief due a successful Title VII
plaintiff.138 The court held that a sufficient showing of after-acquired evidence
mandates the drawing of a boundary between the preservation of the
employer's lawful prerogatives and the restoration of the discrimination
victim. 139 The court concluded that after-acquired evidence cases are best
decided on a case-by-case basis when determining the effects such evidence
140
should have on a plaintiff's remedies under Title VII.
In deciding what effect, if any, after-acquired evidence should have on a
plaintiff's recovery, the court took care to ensure that the respective rights of
the employer and employee were upheld. The court concluded that assuming
after-acquired evidence, in and of itself, would have caused an employer to
discharge the employee, it would be inappropriate for a court to order
reinstatement or front pay in a Title VII discharge case. 14 1 The court believed
that if an employer later discovers a legitimate motive that would establish
cause for an employee's discharge, then reinstatement or front pay would go
beyond making the plaintiff whole and would unduly trammel an employer's
freedom to lawfully discharge an employee.142 Also, because under these same
circumstances an employee would no longer be employed, the court concluded
that an employee would not be entitled to injunctive relief restraining the
employer from further unlawful practices. 14 3
With regard to the period of Title VII back pay that should be awarded, the
court found that the boundary between the competing concerns shifts such that
a plaintiff's back pay period should not terminate prematurely unless the
employer proves that it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence
prior to what would otherwise be the end of the back pay period in the absence
of the allegedly unlawful acts and the litigation.14 4 For example, in Wallace, the
court of appeals held that because the employer introduced no evidence
indicating that it would have discovered the plaintiff's fraudulent concealment
if she had not asserted her rights under Title VII, the court denied summary
136 d. at 1177.
13 7 id.
138
139

d. at 1181.
Id.

140Wallace, 968 F.2d at

1181.

141

ld.

142

d. at 1182.

143

1d.

144

Id.
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judgment for the employer regarding premature termination of any period of
back pay, lost wages or liquidated damages resulting from the employee's
termination.
In its discussion of the various approaches that could be applied to
determine the limit of a plaintiff's remedies, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the alternative approach of ending the period of back pay on
the day the employer actually learned of the after-acquired evidence. 145 The
court believed that such an approach overlooked the teachings of Mt. Healthy
that a victim should be placed in no worse a position than if he or she were not
a member of a protected class and had not engaged in protected conduct. The
court also reasoned that such an approach would have the perverse effect of
providing a windfall to employers who, in the absence of their unlawful act
and the ensuing litigation, would have never discovered the evidence in the
first place. 14 6
This "alternative" approach discussed in Wallace has been applied by the
National Labor Relations Board 147 in many instances, and has most recently
been adopted by the EEOC in its Revised Guidelines of July, 1992. Such an
approach seems to provide the courts with a fair and workable compromise
that equitably balances the respective rights of employer and employee under
Title VII. Under this approach, neither party can take advantage of their
wrongful behavior and each party is properly compensated (or not
compensated) for his or her respective misconduct. The EEOC's approach
strikes a fair and equitable balance between two individuals who are not
wholly innocent and is most in accord with the purpose of Tile VII and back
pay relief.

145Wallace, 968 F.2d at 1182.
14 6

1d.
The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB) has addressed the issue
of after-acquired evidence in discrimination cases long before the Tenth Circuit in
Summers, yet generally the federal courts have not looked to NLRB decisions for
guidance. But see Printon v. Sterling Nat'l Bank, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 912 (S.D. N.Y. Jan.
31,1990)(Rejecting employer's argument that because the plaintiff engaged in knowing
misconduct during his tenure at the bank, such misconduct completely barred
reinstatement and back pay. Relying on cases decided under the National Labor
Relations Act, the court could not as a matter of law hold that the plaintiff was
completely barred from recovering damages for the period prior to defendant's
discovery of the alleged misconduct.). The NLRB has treated the after the fact defense
in three different ways and has constantly wavered on exactly how such evidence
should either bar or limit a plaintiff's remedies. Originally, the NLRB applied after
acquired evidence as an "almost complete defense," denying reinstatement and back
pay, but issuing cease and desist orders and ordering a notice be posted by the employer
finding that an unfair labor practice was committed. Currently, the NLRB applies the
after-the-fact defense as a partial defense, denying reinstatement but awarding partial
back pay. Back pay will be awarded from the date of the unlawful discharge until the
date that the predischarge misconduct was discovered. Rubenstein, supra, note 2, at 3,
4 n.9.
147

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1994

21

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:539

III. THE EEOC GUIDELINES--A FAIR AND EQUITABLI, APPROACH IN ACCORD
WITH THE PURPOSE OF TITLE VII
A. The Purposeof Title VII and Back Pay
The purpose of judicial relief in employment discrimination cases is to
reimburse or, insofar as is possible, make whole the individual or class affected
by the discrimination and to prevent employers from engaging in such illegal
actions in the future. 148 The remedial provisions of Title VII and other
employment discrimination laws are intended to provide full corrective and
preventive remedies for violations. 14 9 By allowing an employer to escape all
liability for his illegal conduct in an after-acquired evidence case, a plaintiff is
neither made whole nor an employer properly deterred from committing such
discriminatory actions in the future. However, to allow an employee to recover
for lost wages beyond the period that his or her misconduct is discovered goes
against traditional equitable principles.
In Albemarle v. Moody Paper Co., 150 the Supreme Court set forth the
appropriate standard that a federal district court should follow in deciding
whether to award or deny back pay when an employee has lost the opportunity
to earn wages because an employer has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory
employment practice. 151 The Court stated that "the power to award back pay
was bestowed by Congress, as part of a complex legislative design directed at
a historic evil of national proportions."1 52 According to the Court, a court must
exercise this power in light of the large objective of the Act - to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor one group of employees over another.153 In finding that back pay
has an obvious connection with this purpose, the Supreme Court determined
that if employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order (or worse yet,
could escape liability altogether), they would have little incentive to shun
practices of dubious legality.154 "it is the reasonably certain prospect of a back
pay award that provides the catalyst which causes employers and unions to
self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor

148Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975)("This 'make whole'
purpose of Title VII is made evident by its legislative history. The back pay provision
of Title VII was expressly modeled after the back pay provision of the National Labor
Relations Act. Under that Act, making workers whole for losses suffered on account of
unfair labor practices is part of the vindication of the public policy.")
149Overview of Judicial Remedies, Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) No. 617, at 431:301
(1989).
150422 U.S. 405 (1975).
151AIbenarle PaperCo., 422 U.S. at 408.
1 52
1d. at 416.
1 53

1d. at 417.

1 54

1d.
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to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and
ignominious page in this country's history."155
The Court in Albemarle held that a district court's decision to award back pay
must be measured against the purposes which inform Title VII.156 The Court
believed that this was shown by Congress's care in arming the courts with full
equitable powers. 157 The historic purpose of equity is to secure complete
justice.158 "The term equity denotes the spirit and habit of fairness, justness,
and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men."159
Justice is not secured under Title VII if courts continue to bar total recovery in
after-acquired evidence cases. Not only will the purpose of making the plaintiff
whole be thwarted, but the employer will not be encouraged whatsoever to
cease his discriminatory conduct. The Supreme Court has stated that in
discrimination cases, '"back pay should be denied only for reasons which ...
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
160
suffered ....
By the same token, however, an award of back pay is not automatic or
mandatory.161 It is an equitable remedy which courts may invoke. 162 Such
discretionary choices are not to be left to a court's inclination, but are to be
guided by sound legal principles. Because after-acquired evidence cases deal
with an imperfect situation of two wrongdoers, the EEOC's policy to end back
pay after the employee's misconduct is discovered fairly balances the interests
of employer and employee in accordance with the principles of Title VII.163
B. The EEOC Guidelines of 1992
Although the EEOC has now adopted a fair and equitable approach in
determining the appropriate remedies to be awarded a successful complainant,
the EEOC first adopted the Summers approach and barred recovery where
after-acquired evidence was present. This approach was set forth in the

155Id.
156Albemarle PaperCo., 422 U.S. at 421.
157 d. at 418.
158Id.
159

BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1991).

160

AlbenarlePaperCo., 422 U.S. at 421.
161Id. at 415.
1621d.
163"[Biack pay award[s] [are] equitable and compensatory in nature, rather than a
punishment or penalty assessed against wrongdoers. Shulenberger, supra note 97, at
485-86. Therefore, an employee should not be denied back pay as apenalty fora previous

wrongdoing. Likewise, back pay should not be unfairly assessed an employer.
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Commission's "Policy Guidance Analyzes Disparate Treatment Theory," dated
March 1, 1991.164

Section IV of this Policy stated that "in cases where discrimination is proved
through circumstantial evidence, the employer may be able to limit relief
available to the plaintiff by showing that after-the-fact lawful reasons would
have justified the same action."165 The EEOC concluded that if the charging
party was terminated for discriminatory reasons, but the employer later
discovered that he or she stole from the company, and the employer had an
absolute policy of firing anyone who committed theft, then the employer
would not be required to reinstate the charging party or provide back pay.166
In July of 1992, however, the EEOC issued its Revised Enforcement Guide
on Recent Developments in Disparate Treatment to clarify the Commission's
position on the evaluation of indirect evidence, direct evidence, and evidence
of mixed-motives under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, in
light of the amended Civil Rights Act of 1991.167 In this Guide, the Commission
overturned its 1991 policies and specifically distinguished after-the-fact cases
and mixed-motive cases. The EEOC concluded that the two situations were not
the same, and therefore, required two distinct approaches.
With respect to mixed-motive cases, the Commission concluded that in such
cases, "[o]nce a complainant proves that discrimination was a motivating factor
for an adverse employment action, the burden of proof shifts to the employer
to establish that it would have taken the same action absent the
discrimination."168 If the employer makes this showing, then under the new
Civil Rights Act, and as determined by the Commission, the employer will not
be required to pay compensatory or punitive damages, or be subject to an order
reinstating, hiring, promoting the complainant or be assessed back pay.169
In its new policy guidelines, the EEOC devoted an entire section specifically
addressing cases where evidence of a legitimate basis is discovered
after-the-fact and the bearing this evidence would have on a plaintiff's
remedies. The EEOC stated that "[i]n order for a case to be considered one of
'mixed-motives,' to which Section 107 of the new Act applies, both the
legitimate and discriminatory motives must have been operating at the time of

164

EEOC Policy Guidance Analyzes DisparateTreatment Theory, [Transfer Binder] Emp.

Prac. Guide (CCH) 115297, at 6999-128 (Mar. 7, 1991).
165Id. at 6999-136.
166

1d. The EEOC cited the Summers decision, Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728
F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), and Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991
(D. Kan. 1989), in support of this proposition.
167 EEOC: Revised Enforcement Guide on Recent Developments in DisparateTreatment

Theory, Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) No. 702, at 405:6915 (July 7, 1992) [hereinafter
EEOC: DisparateTreatment].
168

1d. at 405:6924.
Id.

169
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the decision."170 The Commission concluded that when employers terminate
employees based on discriminatory motives, but later discover legitimate bases
17 1
for the terminations, the legitimate reason did not motivate the terminations.

Nevertheless, under the EEOC guidelines, if employers are able to produce
proof of a justification discovered subsequently that would have induced them
to take the same action, the employers will be shielded from orders requiring
reinstatement of the complainants, or payment of the portion of back pay
accruing subsequent to the date on which the legitimate bases for the adverse
action were discovered, along with the portion of compensatory damages
covering losses arising after that date.172 If the discovery date is unknown, then
an appropriate percentage reduction should be made according to an
assessment of the approximate discovery date.173
Under Section 102 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a complainant is entitled
to punitive damages if he or she established that the employer engaged
in discrimination 'with malice or with reckless indifference to the

federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.' If a
complainant makes this showing, but the employer proves that a
lawful reason which actually motivated it at the time of the decision
would have induced it to take the same action, then the case is one of

17OId. at 405:6926.
17 1

1d.

72

1 EEOC: DisparateTreatment, supra note 167, at 405:6926. To explain exactly the
Commission would apply these findings, the Commission cited the following example:
CP (Hispanic) produces direct evidence that R (employer) refused to
hire her for a management position pursuant to a company policy not
to hire or promote any Hispanics for management positions. R is unable
to refute the evidence of the discriminatory policy, but asserts that CP
had lied on her application when she stated that she had earned a
Masters in Business Administration. The investigation confirms that CP
lied on her application, but that R first discovered this in the course of
gathering information to respond to the EEOC charge. The Commission,
in these circumstances, would find that R has violated Title VII by discriminating against CP because of her national origin. It would seek
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent R from discriminating in a
similar fashion in the future, and attorney's fees, if appropriate. The
Commission would also seek back pay accruing prior to the date on
which the application falsification was discovered, and compensatory
damages for any losses that arose prior to that date. Punitive damages
could be sought if the charge is based on post- 1991 Act conduct, and
if it is determined that respondent's conduct was sufficiently egregious
to merit such relief. However, because after-the-fact lawful reasons
would have justified the same action, the Commission will not pursue
reinstatement or the remainder of the back pay or compensatory damages
to which CP would have been entitled had she not falsified her
application....
Id. at 405:6927-28.
17

3Id. at 405:6926.
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mixed motives, and according to Section 107 of the Act, punitive
damages may not be awarded. However, if the employer's sole
motivation was discriminatory and it acted with "malice or with
reckless indifference" to the victim's rights, proof of an after-the-fact
justification would not shield
174 an employer from an order requiring it
to pay punitive damages.
Why the Commission waited until the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
to change its view regarding after-acquired evidence is unclear. The
amendment to the language of the 1991 statute was not intended to clarify the
role that after-acquired evidence should play in discrimination suits brought
under Title VII. Regardless of its reasons, however, the EEOC has now correctly
recognized that mixed-motive principles should not apply to the law
governing after-acquired evidence and that an employer should not escape
total liability for its unlawful conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
An employer should be considered a wrongdoer under Title VII if it has acted
out of a motive that is declared illegitimate by the statute and should be held
accountable for his actions. What is most disconcerting about the Summers rule
is that it so strongly favors the employer in after-acquired evidence cases
without regard to the employee's injury. One legal commentator has plainly
stated, "[tihere is something wrong with a body of law which allows an
employer to cover up its illegal activities by searching an employee's past for
unknown falsifications." 175
Ultimately, the split among the circuits will have to be resolved by the United
States Supreme Court in order to have uniformity and consistency concerning
the impact of after-acquired evidence on discrimination cases. On review, the
Court should strictly apply its holding in Price Waterhouse and hold that the
circuits have misapplied mixed-motive principles to cases involving
after-acquired evidence. The Court should give due deference to the EEOC's
findings and conclusions of law as stated in its policy guidelines. These policy
guidelines provide a workable standard that fairly and equitably balance each
party's rights under Title VII. Until the issue of after-acquired evidence is
resolved, however, employers will continue to successfully avoid liability for
their discriminatory actions, and courts will continue to remind employees that
honesty is the best policy.
V. ADDENDUM
On January 23,1995, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision
inMcKennon v. Nashville BannerPublishingCo.176 which finally resolved the split
174

1d. at 405:6927.

175Rubenstein, supra note 2, at 28.
176115 S.Ct. 879 (1995).
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among the circuits regarding the impact of after-acquired evidence in
employment discrimination cases. 177 The question before the Court in
McKennon was "whether an employee discharged in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (hereinafter ADEA) is barred from
all relief when, after her discharge, the employer discovers evidence of
wrongdoing that, in any event, would have led to the employee's termination
on lawful and legitimate grounds."178 Although McKennon involved a claim
brought under the ADEA, the Court's decision appears to be equally applicable
to claims brought under the various antidiscrimination statutes including, Title
VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Fair Labor Standards Act,
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the National Labor Relations Act. 179
McKennon involved an employee who sued her employer, Nashville Banner
Publishing Company, for violating the ADEA.1 80 In her suit, McKennon sought
a variety of legal and equitable remedies available under the Act, including
backpay.181 McKennon had worked for the Nashville Banner for
approximately 30 years.' 82 She was discharged, the Banner claimed, as part of
a reduction in force necessitated by cost considerations. 183 McKennon was 62
years old at the time of her discharge. 184

17 7
The Court specifically stated, "We granted certiorari, [citation omitted] to resolve
conflicting views among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether all relief must
be denied when an employee who has been discharged in violation of the ADEA and
the employer later discovers some wrongful conduct that would have led to discharge
if it had been discovered earlier." 115 S. Ct. at 883 (citing O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12
F.3d 176 (10th Cir. 1994); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992);
Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992); Summers v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988)).

178 McKnnon, 115 S. Ct. at 882.
179

See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884, wherein the Court recognized that:
[Tihe ADEA, enacted in 1967 as part of an ongoing congressional effort
to eradicate discrimination in the workplace, reflects a societal condemnation of invidious bias in employment decisions. The ADEA is but part
of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace
nationwide.... The ADEA incorporates some features of both Title VII
and the Fair Labor Standards Act, which has led us to describe it was
'something of a hybrid.' [citation omitted] The substantive, antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA are modeled upon the prohibitions of
Title VII. [citation omitted] Its remedial provisions incorporate by
reference the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. [citation
omitted]

180 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
181Id.
18 2

1d. at 882.

183

Id.

184

d. at 882-83.
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During pre-trial discovery McKennon admitted in her deposition that she
copied several confidential documents bearing upon the company's financial
condition. 185 A few days after her deposition, the Banner sent McKennon a
letter declaring that her removal and copying of the records was in violation
186
of her job responsibilities and again advised her that she was terminated.
The Banner then filed a motion for summary judgment conceding that it had
discriminated against McKennon but argued that McKennon's misconduct
was grounds for her termination and that neither backpay nor any other
remedy was available to her under the ADEA.1 8 7 Both the district court and
the court of appeals agreed with this argument and, relying on cases such as
188
Honeywell and Summers, granted summary judgment in the Banner's favor.
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
and held that an employee discharged in violation of the ADEA is not barred
from all relief when, after her discharge, her employer discovers evidence of
wrongdoing that, if discovered, would have led to her termination on lawful
and legitimate grounds.189 The Court questioned the legal soundness of the
lower courts' rulings which held that the misconduct of McKennon rendered
it irrelevant whether or not the Banner discriminated against her.190 In response
to the lower courts' determination, the Court concluded that "a violation of the
ADEA cannot be so altogether disregarded." 191
One of the primary bases for the Court's reversal in McKennon was the
recognition that decisions such as Summers and its progeny undermine the very
purpose and objective of the federal antidiscrimination statutes. 192 The Court
in McKennon noted that:
Deterrence is one object of these statutes. Compensation for injuries
caused by the prohibited discrimination is another.... The private
litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both the
deterrence and the compensation objectives of the ADEA.... It would
not accord with this scheme if after-acquired evidence of wrongdoing

185 McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
18

61d.

187id.
188

d. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered McKennon's misconduct,
in effect, to be supervening grounds for termination and reaffirmed that it "firmly
endorsed the principles that after acquired evidence is a complete bar to any recovery
by the former employee where the employer can show it would have fired the employee
on the basis of the evidence." Id. at 883-84.
189

1d. at 881 (syllabus).

190

McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883-84.

91

1 1d. at 884.
192 See id. at 884-85.
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in every instance, to
that would have resulted in termination operates,
193
bar all relief for an earlier violation of the Act.
Moreover, the Court also confirmed that decisions like Summers, which rely
on the holdings of Mt. Healthy and Price Waterhouse, are ultimately
misguided. 194 The Court in McKennon stated that "our decision in [Mt. Healthy]
.*. is inapplicable here...." and confirmed that mixed-motive principles are
inapposite to after-acquired evidence cases. 195 The Court correctly observed
that in an after-acquired evidence case "[tihe employer could not have been
motivated by knowledge it did not have and it cannot now claim that the
employee was fired for the nondiscriminatory reason." 196 The Court also
emphasized that the only relevance mixed-motive cases have in after-acquired
evidence cases is that "they underscore the necessity of determining the
employer's motives in ordering the discharge, an essential element in
determining whether the employer violated the federal antidiscrimination
law."197 Other than for that limited purpose, mixed-motive principles should
not be extended to after-acquired evidence cases. For in the words of the Court,
"proving that the same decision would have been justified ... is not the same
as proving that the same decision would have been made." 198
Although the Court in McKennon held that predischarge employee
misconduct will not act as a complete bar to recovery, the Court was unwilling
to disregard an employee's misconduct altogether. Rather, the Court held that
after-acquired evidence of the employee's wrongdoing must be taken into
account to determine the appropriate remedy, "lest the employer's legitimate
concerns be ignored."199 The Court emphasized that:
The ADEA, like Title VII, is not a general regulation of the workplace
but a law which prohibits discrimination. The statute does not
constrain employers from exercising significant other prerogatives and
discretions in the course of the hiring, promoting, and discharging
employes. [citation and parenthetical omitted] In determining
appropriate remedial action, the employee's wrongdoing becomes
relevant not to punish the employee, or out of concern 'for the relative
moral worth of the parties,' [citation omitted] but to take due account
of the liwful prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its

193

d. at 884.

194See id. at 885.
195

McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
196fd.
197

1d.

198

Id.

199

Id.
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business and the corresponding
equities that it has arising from the
200
employee's wrongdoing.
Therefore, the Court determined that the proper boundaries of remedial
relief in cases involving after-acquired evidence must be addressed on a
case-by-case basis. 201 However, as a general rule, neither reinstatement nor
front pay is an appropriate remedy.202 According to the Court, the beginning
point in formulating a remedy should, therefore, be calculation of backpay
from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was
discovered. A court can also consider any extraordinary equitable
203
circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party.
In order to limit the relief afforded a plaintiff, however, it is not enough for
an employer merely to discover and offer as evidence instances of predischarge
employee misconduct. 'Where an employer seeks to rely upon after-acquired
evidence of wrongdoing, [as a defense to limiting relief], it must first establish
that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have
been terminated on those grounds alone had the employer known of it at the
time of the discharge." 20 4 By placing this burden of proof on the employer, the
Court believes that such a standard will help to prevent employers from
routinely undertaking extensive discovery into an employee's background or
205
job performance to resist claims.
GEORGIA STANAITIS

20 0

McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
2011d.
202Id.
203

Id.

204

1d.

20 5

McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886-87.
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